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Background: Famine early warning systems clearly identified the risk of famine in South Central Somalia in 2010–
2011 but timely action to prevent the onset of famine was not taken. The result was large scale mortality,
morbidity, and population displacement.
Discussion: The main factor that turned a drought-related food crisis into a famine was the war that afflicted
southern Somalia and the tactics adopted by the various belligerents. These included non-state actors, regional, and
international governments. In disasters and complex emergencies, such as this, we posit that five conditions need
to be in place to enable humanitarian agencies to provide a timely response to early warnings of famine. These are:
presence; access; adequate funding; operational capacity; and legal protection for humanitarian action. In the run
up to the Somalia famine each of these presented severe challenges to humanitarian action. The design of the
current coordination and funding system contributed to the problems of achieving a neutral, independent, and
effective humanitarian response.
Summary: The 2011 famine in Somalia was predicted and could have been mitigated or prevented if the
humanitarian response had been timely and more effective. To improve responsiveness to early warnings, action is
required to better insulate the humanitarian system from political agendas. While overcoming constraints, such as
lack of access, may sometimes be beyond the scope of humanitarian actors, more could be done to enhance the
perceived neutrality of parts of the humanitarian system. This should include a reappraisal of the cluster
coordination system and reforms to donor funding mechanisms.
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War on terrorBackground
On 20 July 2011, in the wake of 11 months of escalating
warnings, the UN declared famine in two regions of South
Central Somalia [1]. Further declarations followed in four
more areas over the course of the next two months [2].
The famine is thought to have cost the lives of 258,000
people, while hundreds of thousands more fled across the
border into Kenya and Ethiopia [3]. Although the media
focussed on drought as the main cause, the 2011 Somalia
famine was caused by multiple factors that included
conflict, the use of anti-terrorism legislation by the US
government to prevent aid reaching Southern Somalia,* Correspondence: a.seal@ucl.ac.uk
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reproduction in any medium, provided the oran increase in global food prices, and other long-standing,
structural factors [4] Additional file 1.
Early warnings of the impending health catastrophe
were sufficient, timely, and robust [5-7]. What was lacking
was timely action and an effective response from national
authorities and the international humanitarian system.
Various reasons for this inappropriate use of early warning
information by donors and decision makers have been
discussed, including their problems in dealing with the
uncertainty inherent in probabilistic analysis and the
absence of definitive statements about future mortality.
Other factors included a lack of advocacy activity to
highlight the impending crisis and the complex political
environment surrounding the conflict [6].
Had there been a more effective response to early
warning, then preventive interventions could have been
undertaken to minimise excess mortality and morbidity.ral Ltd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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when it was, by definition, too late.
More than a year since the end of the famine was de-
clared, food security in Somalia remains precarious and
conflict continues in the south despite the transition from
the previous Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to
an elected parliament. But, there is now a window for re-
flection, which has been used by other authors to consider
various aspects of the failed response and its context
[8]. Here, we focus on why early warnings were ignored
and what reforms to the humanitarian system are required
to help prevent a recurrence of famine in Somalia or
elsewhere?
Discussion
Analysis of the response
We posit that five conditions need to be in place for a
timely response to early warnings by humanitarian
agencies. These are: presence; access; adequate funding;
operational capacity; and legal protection for humanitar-
ian action. Below, we consider each in the run up to the
2011 Somalia famine.
Presence - the physical presence of a humanitarian agency,
or its partners, in an area where humanitarian need exists
or is expected to arise
Without presence, timely action in response to early warn-
ing will be difficult to achieve. In the case of Somalia key
humanitarian actors were missing. The World Food
Programme (WFP) is the UN agency primarily responsible
for the provision of food assistance and the co-leader of
the ‘Food Security Cluster’ in Somalia. As such, it is the
UN ‘provider of last resort’ with an obligation to do every-
thing it can to ‘ensure an adequate and appropriate re-
sponse’ [9]. However, WFP had withdrawn from South
Central Somalia in January 2010 [10]. Already suffering
repeated attacks on its staff, WFP’s presence became
untenable when a 2009 UN monitoring exercise re-
leased preliminary information about significant food
aid diversions, including to al Shabaab and other armed
opposition groups. These findings attracted a good deal
of attention from US officials and the media [11]. The
implementation of US legislation (discussed below)
and associated pressures were other important factors
that may have contributed to the decision by WFP to
withdraw.
Access - the ability to access areas and populations in need,
usually gained via the acceptance of agency activities by all
major belligerents on the ground
In Somalia, humanitarian access has been challenged
for decades. Humanitarian aid has formed a critical
part of the economy and political power has been built
upon it and used to control access to it [12]. In SouthCentral Somalia access was denied to a number of key
agencies by al Shabaab. Shortly after WFP had sus-
pended operations in the region in 2010, it was accused
of political motives and banned, making it impossible
for it to return as famine approached. A further 16 UN
agencies and international NGOs were later banned for
“illicit activities and misconduct” during November
2011, while the famine was on-going [13]. Nonetheless,
operational agencies such as Médecins San Frontières,
Somalia Red Crescent Society, Islamic charities, and
the International Committee of the Red Cross contin-
ued to enjoy access permissions in al-Shabaab administered
areas, albeit with certain restrictions, before and during
the famine. Importantly, these agencies operated largely
outside of the UN-led cluster system [5,7] Additional
file 2.Operational capacity - the ability of a humanitarian
agency to provide the level of services necessary to meet
humanitarian need within its geographical area of
operation and its sector of activities
Without doubt, Somalia presents a very challenging
operating environment and most agencies struggle to
maintain adequate human resource and material cap-
abilities to meet the high level of need. During 2011, it
was particularly difficult to maintain or build adequate
operational capacity in South Central Somalia or to
control or monitor the quality of relief programmes.
Due to insecurity, even agencies that had access to
field sites in Somalia had to usually rely on managing
projects remotely from offices in Nairobi.Adequate funding - the ability of a humanitarian agency to
access sufficient funds in good time, so as to meet the
assessed needs within its geographical area of operation
and its sector of activities
Humanitarian funding in Somalia has varied greatly in re-
cent decades, in response to both changes in need and the
political priorities of donor states [12]. Funding for South
Central Somalia declined by half between 2008 and 2011
as the USA withdrew support and imposed highly strin-
gent reporting restrictions as part of efforts to prevent the
use of aid by al Shabaab [14]. The EU also scaled back
funding to South Central Somalia, to the extent that some
member states were accused of ‘wilful neglect’ as famine
struck [15].
Arguably due to the slow response of western donors,
several new stakeholders did enter the donor pool for
Somalia during 2011. These included Saudi Arabia, Brazil,
Turkey, the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation, and
China [12]. But their contributions, although substantial,
were not adequate to address the shortfall.
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operate in a manner consistent with internationally
accepted humanitarian principles without the perceived or
real threat of legal action against it or its staff
Fear of litigation by governments reduced the speed and
extent of responses that could have prevented the devel-
opment of famine. In particular, sanctions imposed by
the US Office of Foreign Assets Control and extensions
to the criminal code made under the PATRIOT Act, in-
troduced wide spread concern within the humanitarian
community that organisations or individuals could be
prosecuted under US law for undertaking humanitarian
work in areas administered by entities labelled by the US
government as ‘Foreign Terrorist Organizations’, such as
al Shabaab [14,16].
The political context
The humanitarian system failed to prevent famine in
South Central Somalia in 2011, not because of a failure
in early warning, but rather because the five requirements
outlined above were not met. The reasons why are numer-
ous and complex, however we argue that politics was a
key factor.
The strategy of western donors in Somalia was primarily
shaped by the ‘global war on terror’; the priority being to
undermine al Shabaab, the de facto administration in the
worst-affected areas. Inadequate funding was a direct and
inevitable consequence of donor anti-terror legislation. So
was the failure to provide an enabling legal environment
for humanitarian agencies to operate without the threat of
prosecution. This strategy also had serious consequences
for the presence, operational capacity and access of
agencies on the ground. Donor concerns about the di-
version of food aid to al Shabaab almost certainly con-
tributed to WFP’s decision to withdraw following the
critical UN monitoring report. Association with west-
ern donors made it dangerous for agencies to maintain
operational capacity in al Shabaab controlled areas and
made al Shabaab’s decision to ban WFP and 16 other
UN agencies and international NGOs more likely.
Neither was the prevention of famine of primary con-
cern to al Shabaab. In addition to its decision to limit
humanitarian access as part of its propaganda campaign
against the West, reports indicate that al Shabaab also
placed restrictions on the movement of people attempt-
ing to flee affected areas, and extracted agricultural taxes
likely to have exacerbated food insecurity. The military
campaign against the TFG and its regional and western
allies was the overriding priority.
The objectives of regional powers within Somalia are
complex and not purely humanitarian. For example, there
are advantages to Kenya and Ethiopia in being allies of the
West in the global war on terror, most obviously in terms
of aid receipts. In addition, military operations in Somaliamay help achieve wider economic objectives associated
with the development of the Lamu corridor (also known
as LAPSSET), an ambitious project which includes run-
ning an oil pipeline from Lamu on the coast of Kenya
through to the oilfields of Southern Sudan [17]. Associated
infrastructure and tourism development will also benefit
Ethiopia. In addition, there are significant gas reserves
in the Lamu basin, which lies just south of the Kenyan/
Somali border.
All of these offer substantial opportunities for develop-
ing the economies of East Africa. However, the infrastruc-
ture development also requires security and a pacified
Somalia, as land based incursions into the North Eastern
Province of Kenya would threaten the development of
the pipeline whilst marine raids could jeopardise both
the development of the gas concessions and the later
export of oil and gas from Lamu, only 60 miles from the
border.
From this standpoint, the military operations of regional
powers within Somalia, particularly those of Kenya, can be
more easily understood. International attempts to block-
ade al Shabaab held territories were a strategy to weaken
al Shabaab, but made famine in these areas more likely.
The primary objective of an incursion by Kenyan troops
during the famine was not to respond to the kidnapping
of western tourists as originally claimed, but probably to
annex the land west of the Juba river in order to create an
effective buffer territory (Jubaland) [18,19].
And what of the humanitarian agencies operating in
this highly complex and politicised environment? Once
famine was declared they responded rapidly. However
until then, agencies had collectively failed to raise the
alarm or increase their consolidated appeal, on the basis
that it was politically unrealistic to do so given donor
policies towards Somalia [20]. Agencies also failed to
collectively adapt to WFP’s absence from South Central
Somalia: contingency plans were not developed despite
the collapse in presence and operational capacity that
this represented [5], and WFP remained the provider of
last resort despite its questionable ability to perform
this role whilst operationally absent from the areas most
at risk.
Whilst al Shabaab’s claim that the agencies it banned
were pursuing ‘illicit activities’ was probably nonsense,
its underlying concern that they were somehow linked
to hostile governments was not. Agencies working
through the cluster system could never hope to be per-
ceived as neutral. The cluster system was led by the UN,
which in Somalia had a dual humanitarian and political
mandate. It was heavily dependent upon western donors
for its funding and had links both to the UN-mandated
AMISOM force fighting al Shabaab, and the TFG. It is
no surprise that those agencies operating largely outside
of the cluster system maintained the greatest access.
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Macrae and Zwi distinguish between acts of omission
and acts of commission when evaluating how the ac-
tions of warring parties may lead to hunger or famine
[21]. Whilst the facts that fully explain who did what
and why may never come to light, prima facie it appears
that the 2011 Somalia famine followed from multiple
acts of politically motivated omission and commission.
Al Shabaab expelled humanitarian agencies. Donor gov-
ernments withheld funding despite increasingly urgent
warnings of impending famine. Regional powers under-
took military operations that made famine more, not
less likely. Fundamentally, the various political agendas
of donor governments, regional powers, and the warring
authorities within Somalia were incompatible with the
prevention of famine and hindered the ability of the
UN-led cluster system to operate independently and
effectively.
Summary
What can be done to better insulate the humanitarian
system from political influences and prevent these fail-
ures from being repeated? The interface between agen-
cies and donor governments must be better delineated
and scrutinised. In particular, arrangements that can
help isolate funding decisions from geopolitical agendas
must be explored. This might include a greater use of
pooled funds into which donors pay regular upfront
contributions, devolving allocation decisions to agencies
to be based on need. Innovative financing mechanisms
which release funds according to pre-agreed early warn-
ing triggers, allowing agencies to access early funding
without recourse to political decision-making, may also
offer some potential. At a minimum, donor govern-
ments should develop clear and transparent guidelines
that specify when particular humanitarian interventions
are warranted and on what basis they will fund them, so
that they can be held accountable to these Additional
file 3.
The cluster system, embedded within the UN and tied
to national governments, offers important advantages in
situations where the political agendas of donors and na-
tional authorities are aligned. However in complex emer-
gencies such as Somalia, characterised by conflict and
multiple opposing political agendas, there is a fundamen-
tal mismatch between the design of the cluster system and
the need to achieve both actual and perceived humanitar-
ian neutrality. A rethink is needed.
The reforms outlined above are ambitious, if not aspir-
ational. They would certainly be resisted by donor govern-
ments standing to lose power in a depoliticised system.
Nonetheless, they are needed to reduce the risk of the
2011 famine being repeated, in Somalia or in a complex
emergency elsewhere.Additional files
Additional file 1: Background to Somalia [22-28].
Additional file 2: The Cluster Approach for Coordinating
Humanitarian Response to Disasters and Complex Emergencies [29].
Additional file 3: Humanitarian Principles and Humanitarian
Action [30,31].
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